Karim Massimov, the former prime minister and head of Kazakhstan’s security services, is currently detained for high treason and corruption. His case embodies the challenges facing the reform of the country’s services – and its overall ambition to reform and get rid of the past, writes Claude Moniquet.
Claude Moniquet is a former DGSE – France’s foreign intelligence agency – field agent deployed in Eastern Europe and a former journalist, author of some twenty books, in particular on the USSR and Russia. He has been co-director of the ESISC (European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center), an intelligence and geostrategy consultancy, since 2002.
For the past eight months, Kazakhstan has accelerated the modernisation and democratisation of its economy in an effort to emancipate itself from Moscow’s influence. In this context, the supervision of Astana’s security services is a key challenge.
Karim Massimov, 57, is now in detention. Before, he was regarded as an expert on China and pursued a career as a senior civil servant and businessman prior to entering politics.
He first served as a minister and then as deputy prime minister before becoming prime minister in 2007.
He resigned in 2012 before his return in 2014. In 2016, he stepped down again but immediately took over as president of the KNB, the Kazakh internal security services, which succeeded the KGB’s local branch after the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991.
He occupied this post until his arrest in early January 2022.
These years were decisive: in 2015, President Nursultan Nazarbayev was ‘re-elected’ (with 97.7% of the votes) for a fifth consecutive term. But his grip on the country, faced with a deep economic crisis and social unrest, was weakening.
He then started to place his pawns to ensure his and his family’s protection after his departure.
As the head of the KNB, Massimov was to be one of his main intermediaries to ensure that Nazarbayev could keep control of the country from behind the scenes.
On 19 March 2019, after having ruled the country for 28 years, the ageing autocrat finally handed over the presidency to Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.
Tokayev quickly laid the groundwork for the reforms he wanted to push through, which aimed, among other things, at strengthening civil society, developing a multiparty system, growing the economy, and improving the administration. But to do this, he had to rely on the Nazarbayev ‘family’, still present in the nebula of power.
Then, in early January 2022, riots broke out in which, according to the authorities, at least 200 people were killed. The origin of the unrest is to be found in a massive and unexpected increase in the price of gas, but many questions remain about the possible manipulation that may have amplified them.
Several regional sources reported to the ESISC that criminal groups and even Islamist militias had mixed with the rioters. Some went so far as to suggest an attempted coup d’état aimed at overthrowing Tokayev and facilitating the return to power of Nazarbayev or someone close to him.
An independent investigation would be desirable to shed light on these events, but it is in this context that Karim Massimov was dismissed and then arrested.
He is accused, among other things, of misinforming President Tokayev and then allowing the unrest to escalate. According to ESISC sources, he also advised the president to leave the country, which resulted in a power vacuum that could only have benefitted those who wanted to restore the ‘old regime’.
Since assuming full power without interference, Tokayev has greatly accelerated the pace of modernisation and democratisation by expanding the role of parliament, liberalising political expression (demonstrations are no longer repressed), limiting the number of presidential terms to one, and banning those close to the rulers from holding any political office or directing state-owned enterprises.
This last measure is aimed more specifically at fighting corruption.
Better still, since the outbreak of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Kazakhstan has constantly moved closer to Europe and distanced itself from Moscow, condemning the war, affirming that it would never recognise the annexation of Ukrainian territories, or offering to welcome and protect Russians wishing to escape mobilisation.
Against this background of internal reforms and great external tensions, a reform of the KNB, which had remained in the hands of Massimov for five years, was obviously unavoidable.
Since his arrest, Massimov has found supporters to speak out against his detention conditions and the injustice of his fate.
Of course, every prisoner has the right to humane and non-degrading treatment, especially when his arrest is politically motivated.
That said, apart from the fact that the bad conditions of Massimov’s detention remain to be proven, he is probably not in the best position to complain about the harshness of Kazakh prisons or to be a preacher of human rights.
When he was prime minister, and then when he led the KNB, human rights organisations published dozens of reports condemning the prisoners’ situation in the country.
Forced dispersal of even the smallest demonstration, banning of independent media, harassment of opponents, and other arbitrary arrests were commonplace. In 2015, for example, Human Right Watch wrote that “Kazakhstan severely restricts freedom of assembly, expression and religion”.
In 2014, authorities shut down newspapers, imprisoned or fined dozens of people following peaceful protests, and prosecuted followers for practising their religion outside of state control. Critics of the government remained in custody after unfair trials.
Massimov is also alleged to have been involved in the extensive corruption that took place during the Nazarbayev years, which saw tens of billions of dollars disappear, mixing political activities, security responsibilities and private affairs.
His trial, when it does come, must be an example and open to all, because it will perhaps make it possible to reveal what really happened in January 2022.
